Stark Contrasts in Incumbency Effects by Jha, Priyanka Prayag
Clemson University
TigerPrints
All Theses Theses
8-2017
Stark Contrasts in Incumbency Effects
Priyanka Prayag Jha
Clemson University, priyanj@clemson.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses by an authorized
administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jha, Priyanka Prayag, "Stark Contrasts in Incumbency Effects" (2017). All Theses. 2706.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/2706
STARK CONTRASTS IN INCUMBENCY EFFECTS 
A Thesis 
Presented to 
the Graduate School of 
Clemson University 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
Economics  
by 
Priyanka Prayag Jha 
August 2016 
Accepted by: 
Dr. Patrick L. Warren, Committee Chair 
Dr. Scott Barkowski 
Dr. Robert K. Fleck 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
Recent studies of electoral accountability show that in countries like India, Brazil 
and some Eastern European countries incumbents face a disadvantage compared to their 
challengers. These results are in contrast to evidence from the US and other western 
democracies where incumbents enjoy a significant advantage. In order to examine this 
difference in the effects of incumbency status we analyze the Indian parliamentary 
elections between 1998 and 2014. We use Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design to 
study how being an incumbent affects the contestants’ margin of victory and probability 
of winning in a reelection. The results from the study show that incumbents faced a 
consistent disadvantage over the five elections even though the level of disadvantage 
varied over these elections. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Research based on Western democracies shows that incumbent politicians (e.g. 
Ansolabhere et al., 2000; Cox and Katz, 1996; Erilson, 1971; Gelman and King, 1990) 
and political parties (Lee, 2008) demonstrate an advantage during elections at all levels of 
government (e.g. Ansolabhere and Snyder, 2002; Hirano and Snyder, 2009). Although 
most of this research is focused on U.S. elections, studies based on other Western 
democracies also show that incumbents have an advantage over non-incumbents in 
elections (e.g. Hainmueller and Lurz-Kern, 2008; Katz and King, 1999; Carey and 
Shugart, 1995; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987).  
Several theories have been developed to explain this incumbency advantage. 
Incumbents have access to resources that their challengers do not. They can use these 
resources to influence public policies that make them seem more favorable to their 
constituents giving the incumbents a perceived valence advantage (Ashworth, 2005; 
Besley, 2007). They can also use their tenure in office to influence the media to gain 
more visibility, making them seem more ideologically aligned with their constituency 
(Lee, 2016). Incumbents also have the opportunity to generate resources that they can use 
for campaigning in forthcoming elections (Duraisamy et al., 2014). Incumbents, 
therefore, have the ability to influence their constituents in positive ways that can give 
them a considerable advantage over their challengers.  
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It is interesting to note that research on incumbency effects is primarily based on 
mature democracies, concentrating mainly on developed Western countries. More recent 
research based on younger democracies has shown that incumbents in developing 
countries do not enjoy an advantage, and in most cases might face a decided 
disadvantage. For example, studies based on countries like India (Linden, 2004; Uppal, 
2009), Brazil (Klansja and Titiunik, 2013) and across post-communist democracies in 
eastern and Central Europe (Roberts, 2008) show that incumbents face a disadvantage 
compared to their challengers. Contrasting evidence in the nature of incumbency effects 
between developed Western countries and younger developing democracies makes it an 
interesting problem for further exploration.  
Recent studies show that in developing countries like India, incumbents are 
viewed less favorably compared to their challengers. This negative perception of the 
incumbent’s tenure in office could be due to several reasons. For example, lack of social 
and political policies in favor of the constituents, lack of infrastructural developments and 
lack of public utilities can create dissatisfaction among the voters. Corruption on the part 
of office-motivated politician may also affect voter perception of incumbents adversely.  
The purpose of this study is to conduct an empirical analysis of the effect of 
incumbency on election outcomes in India and also track changes in incumbency effects 
over time. We use election data from 543 constituencies over the last five national 
elections to check whether incumbents face a disadvantage (if any) over their challengers. 
Although research exists on previous elections in India (Linden, 2004; Uppal, 2009), the 
more recent elections have not been part of these studies. The Indian political landscape 
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has changed considerably in recent years due to increase in voter awareness and rise of 
regional parties. While single-party majority was the norm prior to 1991, multi-party 
coalition governments have become increasingly common since then. In order to study 
the effect of these changes on voter perception of incumbents it may be instructive to 
look at recent elections.  
We analyze the effect of incumbency on the probability of winning by using a 
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design (Lee, 2001; Miguel and Zaidi, 2003). By using 
margin of victory for both winning and losing candidates and allowing incumbency status 
to be discontinuous at zero, we can study the causal effect of incumbency for candidates 
that have barely won the election as compared to those who have barely lost; as long as 
all other characteristics that can influence probability of winning for all candidates vary, 
on average, continuously at the zero margin (Lee, 2001). We study the effect of being an 
incumbent on the performance in a given election by estimating the relationship of 
probability of winning an election and the margin of victory in the previous election. We 
analyze the incumbency effects for individual political parties over the elections in 1998, 
1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. Aggregated incumbency effects for the two major political 
parties, namely Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Indian National Congress (INC) are 
presented. Since India follows a Westminster type of Parliamentary system, alliances 
between parties are as important as the parties themselves, necessitating analysis of the 
coalitions formed between the political parties. Incumbency effects are thus presented for 
two major coalitions- the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the INC-led 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA).  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Studies based on the United States Congress and other Western democracies show 
that incumbents are more likely to win reelections than non-incumbents (Gelman and 
King, 1990; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2000). Several theories have been 
proposed to explain this advantage. Incumbents can use their time in office to signal their 
efficiency to voters while non-incumbents do not have this opportunity. By strategic use 
of available resources incumbents can gain significant electoral advantage over their 
challengers (Ashworth, 2005; Mayhew, 1974). Designing public policy that aligns with 
the interests of the constituency (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Rivers and Fiorina, 
1989), and using the media to strategically influence voters, incumbents can use their 
office to present themselves more favorably to the voters (Prior, 2006). Alternatively, 
incumbent advantage can also stem from the fact that rational voters assume that time 
spent in office makes incumbents more efficient and better able to serve the constituents 
than their inexperienced challengers (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2008; Zaller, 
1998). This incumbency advantage in resource-rich countries such as the United States is 
not restricted to legislative offices but extends to incumbents in non-legislative offices as 
well (Mahdavi, 2015; Lee 2016). Although these explanations for incumbency advantage 
seem intuitive they do not explain why incumbents in Brazil, India, post-communist 
Europe or Sub-Saharan Africa do not experience a similar advantage and in some cases 
even experience a disadvantage.  
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Recent empirical studies show evidence of incumbency disadvantage in 
developing countries around the world. Lee (2008), Linden (2004) and Uppal (2009) use 
a Regression Discontinuity technique to show that incumbents in national and state 
parliamentary elections were 14 to 22 percent less likely to win in re-elections. Titiunik 
(2009) and Klanja and Titiunik (2013) study mayoral elections in Brazil and find that an 
incumbent political party is 20 percent less likely to win a re-election. The sharp contrast 
in incumbency effects in developed and developing countries has made this an interesting 
problem for further research.  
In spite of growing evidence existing literature does not provide many 
explanations for this incumbency disadvantage. Uppal (2009) studied state elections in 
India and found that the incumbency disadvantage can be attributed to poor government 
performance in provision of public goods. In constituencies that lacked essential utilities 
such as electricity, and fewer schools and hospitals, voters viewed incumbents less 
favorably and were more likely to punish them by voting against them in re-elections. 
This theory shows that voting behavior is influenced by their negative perception of the 
incumbent rather than the merit of their challengers (Eggers and Spirling, 2015; Lee, 
2016). Other studies link incumbency disadvantage in developing countries to corruption 
on the part of office-motivated politicians. Klasnja (Forthcoming) studies mayors in 
Romania and shows that mayors with higher incentives to corruption faced a greater 
disadvantage. In studies based on Indian elections studies showed that the incumbency 
disadvantage stemmed from the participation of candidates with a criminal background in 
state elections (Aidt, Golden and Tiwari (2011).  
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Corruption seems like a plausible explanation for incumbency disadvantage as 
rent extraction is considered wasteful by voters and, therefore, they are less likely to vote 
for rent-seeking office-motivated politicians. In related research incumbency 
disadvantage has been shown to stem from specific institutional characteristics. For 
example, mayors in Brazil face a disadvantage that stems from the lack of term limits and 
weak political parties (Klasnja and Titiunik, 2014). Linden (2004) showed that in India 
there was a marked change in incumbency effects in elections before and after the 1980s. 
The study showed that incumbency disadvantage grew in elections after the 1980s due to 
the decline of the one of the most prominent political parties. While these explanations 
might help explain incumbency disadvantage in certain specific situations it is slightly 
more complicated to generalize these theories. Institutional differences and varying 
electoral processes make it difficult to isolate causal effects that may help explain the 
difference in incumbency effects in developed and developing countries.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
INDIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 
 The legislative branch of the government of the Republic of India follows a 
Westminster parliamentary system, which is a bicameral system consisting of two 
houses: the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and the Rajya Sabha (Council of States). 
The Lok Sabha consists of 545 members who serve a five-year term - 543 of these 
members are elected directly from their respective constituencies and two are nominated 
by the President from the Anglo-Indian community, if in his opinion the Anglo-Indians 
community is not being adequately represented. The Rajya Sabha is a permanent house 
and can have a maximum of 250 members, and unlike the Lok Sabha, is not subject to 
dissolution. Most members of the Rajya Sabha are elected indirectly by state and union 
territory legislatures and twelve are appointed by the President of India based on 
contributions in various fields such as the arts, sports, science and social services. 
Members serve a staggered six-year term with one-third of the members retiring every 
two years. For the purpose of this study, we look at election data from Lok Sabha 
elections that are conducted by the Election Commission of India over 543 
constituencies. The parliamentary system in India follows a single-tier majoritarian 
framework, i.e.  each eligible voter in the country votes once and there is one set of 
elected representatives. All elections are first past the post, where the candidate that gets 
the highest number of votes wins the election.  
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 India has a multi-party political system. All political parties are required to be 
registered with the Election Commission of India. The commission determines the status 
of the party based on set criteria. Registered political parties that are either national or 
state level parties enjoy certain advantages such as broadcast time on public television 
and radio channels. As of September 2016, there are 1761 registered political parties in 
India of which 7 are national-level and 48 are state-level parties. In addition to 
conducting the elections, the Commission also compiles detailed reports on all national 
and state elections. The reports include information on each constituency where elections 
were held. The number of candidates that contested, name of their political parties, 
number of votes cast, number of votes by each candidate and other statistics about the 
electorate. 
 In our study, we focus on five Lok Sabha elections from 1998 to 2014. The Indian 
political scenario has changed significantly over these last few decades. While election 
outcomes were mostly predictable prior to 1989, they have become more competitive 
since. The number of national and regional parties has grown in number. The number of 
candidates contesting in the elections has also increased significantly. Due to the 
competitive political climate and the involvement of state and regional parties in national 
politics, the dominance of a single political party or coalition has become less likely. The 
emergence of smaller regional political parties is a growing trend leading to candidates 
frequently switching party affiliations. Apart from growing competition among parties, 
the rise in communal tensions and caste and religion-based politics have added to the 
volatile nature of the elections. These changes may have significant effects on voter 
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perception of candidates and voter behavior leading to significantly different electoral 
dynamics.  
 Many studies based on the United States and other Western democracies have 
shown that incumbents have a higher chance of being reelected compared to non-
incumbents. The incumbency advantage applied to Indian election as well, before 1989, 
as shown in the study by Linden (2004). However, incumbency advantage has declined 
after 1989 due to the factors listed previously. The trends in the few elections after 1989 
studied by Linden suggest that incumbents may have faced a disadvantage in these 
elections. In this study, we have investigated the progression of this trend regarding the 
incumbency advantage/disadvantage for elections from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we 
have looked at the effects of incumbency on election outcome for every constituency of 
the Lok Sabha for National Elections conducted in 1998, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data has been obtained from the Election Commission of India (ECI). The 
ECI is an autonomous authority set up under the provision of the Constitution of India. 
The Commission is responsible for administering all state and national level elections and 
elections to the offices of the President and Vice President of India. In addition to 
overseeing the elections the ECI also publishes detailed reports on all the constituencies 
where elections were conducted. For each constituency, the reports contain the number of 
candidates contesting, their names and party affiliations, the number of votes won by 
each candidate as well as voter demographics.  In this study we use data for all 543 
constituencies over five general Lok Sabha elections.  
 The dataset used in this study consists of detailed reports for each candidate 
contesting an election for each of the 543 constituencies in India. A snapshot of the data 
is shown in Table 1 below. Each row corresponds to one contesting candidate and lists 
information regarding the candidate, the constituency, party affiliation, the number of 
votes earned and the final position. There are typically between 5000 and 6000 rows of 
data for each election year. The candidates contesting the same constituency are always 
sorted with the winner at the top with the losing candidates following in descending 
order. This handy fact is utilized to identify the winner in each block of rows representing 
a constituency.  
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Table 1: Snapshot of data obtained from the ECI website used for this analysis 
 
State
ID State
Const 
ID
Const. 
name M YYYY
Candid
ate 
Name
G
e
n
d
er
Cas
te Party Votes
Po
sit
io
n 
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 BELLARMIN. A. V.M GEN CPM 410091 1
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 RADHAKRISHNAN. PM GEN BJ 245797 2
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 BALASUBRAMANIAN. TM GEN ABHM 4612 3
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 GEORGE THOMAS. RM GEN IND 4519 4
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 JAMALUDHEEN. BM GEN IND 3336 5
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 SIVAKUMAR. BM SC IND 1758 6
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 MURUGAN. V. N.M GE IND 1618 7
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 MANIKANTA PRASAD. MM GEN SHS 717 8
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 PRABHAKARAN. KM SC IND 401 9
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 SUBASH. PM SC IND 355 10
S22 TAMIL NADU39 Nagercoil 3 2004 THANKAMONY. CGEN IND 351 11
S23 TRIPURA 1 Tripura West3 2004 KHAGEN DASM GEN CPM 496843 1
S23 TRIPURA 1 Tripura West3 2004 NIRMALA DASGUPTAM GEN INC 112207 2
S23 TRIPURA 1 Tripura West3 2004 AMAL MALLIKM GEN AITC 67379 3
S23 TRIPURA 1 Tripura West3 2004 RAMU BANIKM GEN IND 10787 4
S23 TRIPURA 1 Tripura West3 2004 BRAJALAL DEBNATHM GE IND 7023 5
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 Although the data obtained from ECI is detailed there are some inconsistencies 
that make the study of incumbency effects complicated and as such have been noted in 
previous works on this topic. The most significant inconsistency is found in the 
candidates’ names over election periods. The format in which the candidate names were 
recorded has changed often over the years and this makes it difficult to follow the 
election performance of each candidate over the years. To avoid the complications from 
these inconsistencies we focus our analysis on the political party as our variable of 
interest instead of the individual candidate.  
 Lok Sabha elections for the years 1998, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 were 
examined in this analysis at the level of the constituency. The analysis was conducted 
party-wise instead of candidate-wise. This choice can be defended by the ansatz that the 
party name carries more weight in Indian elections than the candidate alone. This choice 
has the added benefit of avoiding any confounding factors due to inconsistencies in the 
reported name of the candidate.  
 Other inconsistencies noted in the dataset involve evolving columns across the 
years studied. Specifically, the name of the column denoting states has been changed 
from ‘state_name’ to ‘ST_NAME’ from the year 2004. The name of the column denoting 
the constituency was changed from ‘PC Name’ to ‘PC_NAME’ in the year 2004. The 
code abstracted these changing names to a name that was held constant across all years to 
facilitate easy analysis in ‘pandas’. A column denoting the caste of the candidate was 
added in 2004, while columns denoting the type of constituency and the age of the 
candidate were added in 2009. The insertion of these columns caused the index of the 
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columns to the right of the inserted columns to increase by 1, and due care was taken to 
use the appropriate index per the year in consideration. Another subtle inconsistency in 
the data was the presence of variable number of trailing spaces in the names of the 
constituencies and the name of the states reported for each candidate. The state and 
constituency name together form a unique identifier used to index each seat available for 
election in the Lok Sabha, and care needs to be taken to remove the trailing spaces to be 
able to match up the correct state and constituency. 
The data was analyzed in ‘pandas’ – a python framework for analyzing large 
datasets. The code has been reproduced in the appendices. STATA was used for 
polynomial regression and the subsequent Regression Discontinuity (RD) analysis, 
following the approach of (Lee 2008; Uppal 2009). The probability of winning of a 
candidate in election ‘t+1’ is plotted as a function of the margin of victory in election ‘t’.  
For elections where the margin of victory in election ‘t’ was huge (say > 40%), then it is 
conceivable and intuitively understandable that the incumbent would have, in normal 
circumstances, a high probability of getting re-elected. On the other hand, if a candidate 
lost by a huge margin in election ‘t’, then that candidate would have a low probability of 
winning in election ‘t+1’. One can then expect the probability of winning in election 
‘t+1’ to be a continuous function of the margin of victory in election ‘t’. However, in Fig. 
1 adapted from Lee (2008), that shows a similar analysis for the Democratic Party in the 
USA, there is an appreciable discontinuity in the probability of winning where the margin 
of victory is zero. 
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Figure 1: Adapted from Lee 2008, figure showing discontinuity at zero signifying 
incumbency advantage 
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 A negative margin of victory signifies that the candidate did not win in election 
‘t’, while a positive margin of victory signifies that the candidate won in both election ‘t’ 
and in election ‘t+1’. Thus, considering the probability of winning when the margin of 
victory in election ‘t’ is close to but on either side of zero, one can see that winners in 
election ‘t’ that have barely won enjoy a significant advantage for re-election in election 
‘t+1’ as compared to losers in election ‘t’ that have barely lost. If we consider close 
elections, where all other factors are considered equal, then the advantage noted above is 
attributed to the fact that the candidate in office has favorable conditions for a successful 
campaign for re-election over his non-incumbent counterpart and is typically referred to 
as ‘incumbency advantage’, which is typically observed in Western democracies and has 
been well documented, as shown in Chapter 2. 
 For this analysis, the data was analyzed party-wise in three different ways  
1. All Party analysis 
2. Party-wise analysis 
3. Coalition-wise analysis 
All Party Analysis 
 The analysis is conducted using all parties contesting the particular 
elections. For every constituency, the margin of victory is calculated for each 
party that contested in that constituency. The margin of victory for all parties that 
did not win the constituency is the difference in the votes received by them as 
compared to the winning party normalized by the total votes cast in that 
constituency. The margin of victory for the winning party is calculated as the 
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difference in the votes received by the winner and the second-place party 
normalized by the total votes cast in that constituency. The margin of victory is 
then binned into 1% intervals and the probability of winning in election ‘t+1’ is 
calculated as the proportion of winners in election ‘t+1’ to the total contestants 
that lie in the same bin. 
Party-wise Analysis: 
This analysis was carried out for the two major political parties present in 
India – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian National Congress (INC). 
Only those constituencies where these two parties contested are considered for 
this analysis, rest were ignored. The margin of victory was calculated as follows – 
if the party in question (BJP or INC) was the winner in election ‘t+1’ and in 
election ‘t’ as well, then the margin of victory is calculated as the difference of 
votes received by the winning party and the second-place party normalized by the 
total votes cast for all candidates in that constituency. If the party in question had 
not won in election ‘t’, the margin of victory is calculated as the difference in the 
votes received by the party as compared to the winning party normalized by the 
total votes cast for all candidates in that constituency. Thus, the margin of victory 
is positive for all incumbent winners and negative for all non-incumbent winners. 
The margin of victory was then binned into intervals of 1%. The probability of 
winning was calculated as the proportion of winners belonging to the party in 
each bin compared to the total elections contested by the party where the margin 
of victory fell in the same bin. 
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Coalition-wise Analysis 
The Indian political system is comprised of two major political parties and 
numerous smaller regional parties. However, no single political party has received the 
majority mandate in these election years (except 2014) to form a majority government, 
and thus coalitions become the driving force in the formation of a stable government. 
There are two major coalitions every year - the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
headed by the BJP, and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) headed by the INC. 
Depending on the political climate at the end of each election, many regional parties are 
known to switch alliances. Thus, the party composition of each coalition changes from 
one election cycle to the next. The year-wise party alliances were hardcoded into the code 
(see appendices). For every party contesting a given constituency, the alliance was 
determined depending on the party and the year. Once the alliance had been determined, 
the rest of the analysis was similar to the analysis described in the party-wise section. 
 
Data Fitting 
 The data was fitted on either side of the abscissa – the axis signifying margin of 
victory. As only close elections are to be considered, the fit was not smoothed over the 
entire range, rather only over 5 points in the local region. This was accomplished by the 
‘-n’ option in the stata lpoly command. As a result, the fits appear jagged as it is not 
smoothed across the entire range; however, only the contributions from close elections 
are considered when establishing the magnitude of the discontinuity at zero. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
  
Results are presented for the three different analyses described in the previous 
section. In all these plots, the ordinate is the probability of winning in election ‘t+1’ while 
the abscissa is the margin of victory in election ‘t’. Calculation of the two parameters has 
been described in the previous section.  
 
All Parties Analysis 
1. 1998-1999:  
Figure 2 shows the scatter plot for the election year ‘t=1998 and ‘t+1’=1999. The 
election was conducted within one year of the previous election due to a coalition 
government losing a no-confidence motion in the Parliament following the 
withdrawal of a party from the coalition. As can be immediately seen in the figure, 
the discontinuity seen in Fig. 1 has disappeared. This signifies that the advantage 
enjoyed by incumbents in the Western democracies like the USA is not enjoyed by 
the incumbents in India. The data was restricted to within 20% margin of victory on 
the x-axis and a fourth degree polynomial was used for the polynomial regression 
following the approach of Lee (2008). The level of incumbency disadvantage is 
approximately 9 percentage points.  
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2. 1999-2004: 
Figure 3 shows the analysis for all parties for the years 1999 – 2004. For this election, 
an incumbency disadvantage of approximately 30 percentage points can be observed 
in this data, which is consistent with all-candidates data analyzed previously (See 
Figure 1 in Duraisamy, Lemennicier and Khouri, 2014).   
3. 2004 – 2009:  
Figure 4 shows the probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of 
victory in 2004. The discontinuity at zero has gone down to approximately 9.6 
percentage points as compared to almost 30 in the last election year. This decrease in 
the incumbency disadvantage is consistent with the results reported in the literature. 
(See Figure 2 in Duraisamy, Lemennicier and Khouri, 2014) 
4. 2009 – 2014:  
This election year has been the most recent one in India and has not been included in 
the studies referenced here. Figure 5 shows the probability of winning in 2014 plotted 
as a function of the margin of victory in 2009. The incumbent still faced a 
disadvantage as compared to the incumbent in the 2009-2014 elections. The 
incumbency disadvantage went up to 10 percentage points in the last elections. 
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The following table summarizes the incumbency disadvantage across all years. 
Table 2: Incumbency Disadvantage from 1998 to 2014 
Year All Parties
1998-1999 9.1
1999-2004 29.8
2004-2009 9.6
2009-2014 10.1  
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Figure 2:The probability of winning in 1999 as a function of the margin of victory in 
1998 
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Figure 3:The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory in 
1999 
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Figure 4:The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in 
2004 
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Figure 5:The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory in 
2009 
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Party-wise Analysis 
Analysis for the BJP and the INC party are presented year-wise. If the Indian political 
system was truly a two party system, then the plots for BJP would be the complement of 
the plots for INC, as it would be in a zero sum game. However, the numerous regional 
parties in India split the vote and the two party approximations are not always valid, thus 
we present results for both parties separately for each year. 
1. 1998 – 1999: 
Figures 6 and 7 show the probability of winning in 1999 plotted against the margin of 
victory in 1998 for BJP and INC respectively. 
2. 1999 – 2004: 
Figures 8 and 9 show the probability of winning in 2004 plotted against the margin of 
victory in 1999 for BJP and INC respectively. 
3. 2004 – 2009: 
Figures 10 and 11 show the probability of winning in 2009 plotted against the margin 
of victory in 2004 for BJP and INC respectively. 
4. 2009 – 2014: 
Figures 12 and 13 show the probability of winning in 2009 plotted against the margin 
of victory in 2004 for BJP and INC respectively. 
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Table 3 summarizes the results from the RD for both parties year-wise. A positive 
number signifies incumbency disadvantage in percentage points, while a negative 
number signifies incumbency advantage in percentage points. As can be seen in the 
table, the incumbency disadvantage is not constant but varies year to year and across 
both parties. There is one instance of incumbency advantage for BJP in 2004 – 2009; 
however, an incumbency disadvantage is faced by both parties in every year to a 
varying degree.  
 
 
Table 3: The incumbency disadvantage for BJP and INC 
Year BJP INC
1998-1999 0.26 0.08
1999-2004 0.07 0.26
2004-2009 -0.38 0.42
2009-2014 0.06 -0.03  
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Figure 6: The probability of winning in 1998 as a function of the margin of victory in 
1999 (BJP) 
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Figure 7: The probability of winning in 1998 as a function of the margin of victory in   
1999 (INC) 
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Figure 8: The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory in 
1999 (BJP) 
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Figure 9: The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory in 
1999 (INC) 
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Figure 10 The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in 
2004 (BJP) 
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Figure 11: The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in 
2004 (INC) 
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Figure 12: The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory in 
2009 (BJP) 
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Figure 13: The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory in 
2009 (INC) 
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Coalition-wise Analysis 
Analysis for the NDA and the UPA alliances are presented year-wise. The BJP-led 
NDA and the INC-led UPA are the two major alliances that dominate the Lok Sabha 
elections. We present results for both alliances separately for each year. 
1. 1998 – 1999: 
Figures 14 and 15 show the probability of winning in 1999 plotted against the margin 
of victory in 1998 for NDA and UPA respectively. 
2. 1999 – 2004: 
Figures 16 and 17 show the probability of winning in 2004 plotted against the margin 
of victory in 1999 for NDA and UPA respectively. 
3. 2004 – 2009: 
Figures 18 and 19 show the probability of winning in 2009 plotted against the margin 
of victory in 2004 for NDA and UPA respectively. 
4. 2009 – 2014: 
Figures 20 and 21 show the probability of winning in 2009 plotted against the margin 
of victory in 2004 for NDA and UPA respectively. 
Table 4 summarizes the results from the RD for both alliances year-wise. A positive 
number signifies incumbency disadvantage in percentage points, while a negative 
number signifies incumbency advantage in percentage points. As can be seen in the 
table, the incumbency disadvantage is not constant but varies year to year and across 
both alliances.  
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Table 4: The incumbency disadvantage for NDA and UPA 
Year NDA UPA
1998-1999 0.06 0
1999-2004 0.23 0.09
2004-2009 -0.08 0.4
2009-2014 0 0  
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Figure 14: The probability of winning in 1998 as a function of the margin of victory in  
1999 (NDA) 
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Figure 15: The probability of winning in 1998 as a function of the margin of victory in  
1999 (UPA) 
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Figure 16: The probability of winning in 1999 as a function of the margin of victory in  
2004 (NDA) 
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Figure 17: The probability of winning in 1998 as a function of the margin of victory in  
1999 (NDA) 
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Figure 18: The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory in  
2009 (NDA) 
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Figure 19: The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory in  
2009 (UPA) 
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Figure 20: The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in  
2014 (NDA) 
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Figure 21: The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in  
2014 (UPA) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this study we have analyzed the results of five Indian parliamentary elections to 
determine the effect of incumbency status on the probability of winning and margin of 
victory of contestants using the Regression Discontinuity design. The RD design enables 
us to study close elections where candidates who barely won and those that barely lost 
can be considered to differ only in their incumbency status, thereby allowing us to study 
the effects of incumbency status.  
The results show that there is consistently an incumbency disadvantage faced by 
electoral candidates in India as observed in the last five elections. The level of 
incumbency disadvantage varies widely year-to-year, from a few percentage points up to 
almost 30 percentage points. Factors such as elections being held out of cycle or after a 
hung parliament might affect the level of incumbency as seen in the 1998-1999 elections. 
Similarly, other local and national events caused incumbency disadvantage to change 
from 26 percent in 2004 to 10 percent in 2009. In the most recent elections in 2014 BJP 
had a landslide win and the incumbency disadvantage reduced to 10 percent.  
Conducting this analysis on the basis of political parties instead of individual 
candidates helped us deal with the inconsistencies that arise due to mismatch of candidate 
names. Additionally, we were able to avoid the conditional dependencies of the candidate 
rerunning for elections in election ‘t+1’. While there are very few instances of parties not 
contesting consecutive elections in a constituency, they are negligible as compared to the 
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number of instances of candidates from a particular party being nominated to contest in 
consecutive elections.  
The primary conclusion of the study is that incumbents are disadvantaged in the 
Indian Parliamentary elections and this disadvantage has persisted over the last few 
decades. Due to the contrasting nature of the results to those from countries such as the 
United States make this a significant study in understanding how voter behavior varies 
across countries. It may also be valuable to study why these differences in incumbency 
effects exist and how incumbent behavior affects voter perception of incumbents. These 
are some of the areas that can be explored in further studies on the topic of incumbency 
effects.  
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Appendix A 
Category-wise Analysis 
 
We have shown in the preceding sections that a definite incumbency disadvantage 
exists for political parties in India. To test whether this disadvantage is due to other 
factors, it is necessary to analyze the data looking at other classifications. Here we have 
analyzed the data considering the caste category of the candidate, to identify whether the 
caste had any contribution to the incumbency disadvantage. The data for the caste of the 
candidate is available since 2005, so we have analyzed the elections in 2005,2009 and 
2014. Te analysis is similar to that carried out in Secion 5a, where the classification by 
party is replaced by a classification by the caste of the candidate.  
The impact of the caste of the candidate on the incumbency effects dictates 
whether the shape of the graph in the case of the category-wise analysis would look 
similar to the shape of the graph in the party-wise analysis. The graphs for 2004-2009 and 
2009-2014 are presented below in Figs. A.1 and A.2. As can be seen in the figures, there 
is no discontinuity observed in the graphs as for the party-wise analysis. This indicates 
that the caste of the candidate is not a confounding factor for the party-wise analysis 
carried out in the preceding sections. Similar tests for other variables should be carried 
out in the future to eliminate any possible confounding factors from the analysis. 
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Figure 22: The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in 
2004 considering candidate caste 
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Figure 23: The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory in 
2009 considering candidate caste 
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Appendix B 
Pandas Code for ‘All Parties’ 
 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Sun Jun 26 19:06:52 2016 
 
@author: labuseruni 
""" 
import math 
import pandas as pd 
import numpy as np 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
from operator import itemgetter,attrgetter 
 
#df_2009=pd.read_csv('2009.csv') 
bin_width=1.0 
#set bin_width in percent margin of vote share 
yearlist= [ '1998','1999','2004','2009','2014'] 
#yearlist= [ '2009','2014'] 
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partylist= ['all_parties'] 
 
for year_i in range(0,len(yearlist)-1): 
     
         
#    year1='1998' 
#    year2='1999' 
    year1=yearlist[year_i]; 
    year2=yearlist[year_i+1]; 
    df_t1=pd.read_csv(year1+'.csv') 
    df_t2=pd.read_csv(year2+'.csv') 
    for partyname in partylist: 
        #partyname='INC' 
        outputfile=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v3.csv' 
        outputfile2=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v3.txt' 
        #Replace space in column name with _ 
        df_t1.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t1.columns] 
        df_t2.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t2.columns] 
         
         
        #Rename column names so they arent different across years 
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        #Hacks for this to work, should be more seamless using decided key-value pairs for 
'interesting' columns 
        y2014={'statename': 'State name','pcname': 'PC Name','partyname_index': 
11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 13} 
        y2009={'statename': 'State name','pcname': 'PC Name','partyname_index': 
11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 13} 
        y2004={'statename': 'ST_NAME','pcname': 'PC_NAME','partyname_index': 
10,'votes_index': 11,'position_index' : 12} 
        y1999={'statename': 'ST_NAME','pcname': 'PC_NAME','partyname_index': 
9,'votes_index': 10,'position_index' : 11} 
        y1998={'statename': 'ST_NAME','pcname': 'PC_NAME','partyname_index': 
9,'votes_index': 10,'position_index' : 11} 
         
         
        mydict={'2014':y2014,'2009':y2009,'2004':y2004,'1999':y1999,'1998':y1998} 
         
        dict1=mydict[year1] 
        dict2=mydict[year2] 
         
         
        #creates new column that is unique 
        #2009&2014 have col name 'State_name', previous years have 'ST_NAME' 
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        if(year1=='2009' or year1 == '2014'): 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.State_name.str.cat(df_t1.PC_name,sep='_') 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper() 
        else: 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t1.PC_NAME,sep='_') 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper() 
        #PC_names have trailing spaces! - the 'strip' removes these so we can search 
between different years! 
         
        if(year2=='2009' or year2 == '2014'): 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.State_name.str.cat(df_t2.PC_name,sep='_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper() 
        else: 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t2.PC_NAME,sep='_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip() 
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            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper() 
         
         
         
        unique_vals_t1=df_t1['Unique'].unique() 
        unique_vals_t2=df_t2['Unique'].unique() 
        unique_vals = list(set(unique_vals_t1).intersection(unique_vals_t2)) 
        unique_vals.sort() 
        #unique_vals now has id per constituency common to both years 
         
        df_t1_indexed=df_t1.set_index('Unique') 
        df_t2_indexed=df_t2.set_index('Unique') 
        #alternatively, try indexing with two columns? for another day. 
         
         
        #for now, use arrays: 
        a_t1=df_t1.values 
        a_t2=df_t2.values 
         
        out_a_t1=[] 
        margins=[] 
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        #unique,margin,won_flag 
        margin_based_t1=[] 
         
        count=0 
        for v in unique_vals: 
            print(v) 
            df_t1_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t1_indexed.loc[v]) 
            df_t2_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t2_indexed.loc[v]) 
             
            a_t1_constituency_slice=df_t1_constituency_slice.values 
            a_t2_constituency_slice=df_t2_constituency_slice.values 
             
            #Start processing per slice i.e. per constituency 
            total_votes=0 
            margin=0.0 
             
            #index to locate where in the slice the particular party we are interested in lies 
            #assuming dataset is sorted within constituency 
            #if the party was a winner, this will be first pos i.e. value of indec will be 0; else 
non-zero 
            partyname_position_in_slice=-1 
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            """ 
            if(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \ 
            or a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \ 
            or a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']] not in partylist \ 
            or a_t2_constituency_slice[1][dict2['partyname_index']] not in partylist ): 
                
#print(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t1_constituency_slice[1][d
ict1['partyname_index']],a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t2_cons
tituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']]) 
                #wait=input()                 
                continue; 
            """ 
                 
            #binary variable -  
            # =1 if party won in t+1 
            # =0 if party did not win in t+1 
            won_flag=0; 
            
#print(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t1_constituency_slice[1][d
ict1['partyname_index']],a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']],a_t2_cons
tituency_slice[1][dict2['partyname_index']]) 
            count+=1 
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            """ 
            winning_partyname_in_t2=a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']] 
             
            for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']] 
                
if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==winning_partyname_in_t2): 
                    partyname_position_in_slice=i; 
                    #assumption here is that there are never multiple candidates from same party 
contesting the same constituency 
             
            if partyname_position_in_slice==-1: 
                continue; 
            """ 
 
 
            for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']] 
                 
            for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                if(i==0): 
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                    margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']] 
                else: 
                    margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']] 
                 
                margin = margin*100.0/total_votes 
                 
                
if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict
2['partyname_index']]): 
                    won_flag=1; 
                else: 
                    won_flag=0; 
                     
                
margin_based_t1.append([v+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']],margi
n,won_flag]) 
                 
            """ 
            if(partyname_position_in_slice==0): 
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                margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']] 
                won_flag=1; 
            else: 
                
margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[partyname_position_in_slice][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']] 
                won_flag=0; 
                 
            margin = margin*100.0/total_votes 
            """ 
             
            """ 
            if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                won_flag=1 
            else: 
                won_flag=0 
            """ 
            """ 
            margin_based_t1.append([v,margin,won_flag]) 
            """ 
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        #here we have generated margin_based_t1 table 
        #cols are unique(pc_id),margin in t1 for party, flag indicating whether party won or 
not in t2 
        #sort by margin 
         
        margin_based_t1=sorted(margin_based_t1,key=itemgetter(1)) 
        binned_margin_t1=[] 
         
        for i in range(len(margin_based_t1)): 
            bin_no=int(math.floor(abs((margin_based_t1[i][1]))/bin_width)) 
            if(margin_based_t1[i][1]<0.0): 
                sign_flag=-1.0 
            else: 
                sign_flag=+1.0 
            bin_no=int(bin_no*bin_width)+bin_width/2.0 
            bin_no=bin_no*sign_flag 
            print(margin_based_t1[i][1],bin_no) 
            binned_margin_t1.append([bin_no,margin_based_t1[i][2]]) 
             
         
        half_total_bins=int(math.ceil(100/bin_width))#one-sided total 
        final_binned_margin=[] 
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        for i in range(half_total_bins): 
            bin_no_search1=-1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0) 
            bin_no_search2=+1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0) 
             
            count_won1=0 
            count_all1=0 
            count_won2=0 
            count_all2=0     
             
            for j in range(len(binned_margin_t1)): 
                 
                if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search1): 
                    count_all1=count_all1+1;                    
                    if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1): 
                        count_won1=count_won1+1; 
                         
                if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search2): 
                    count_all2=count_all2+1; 
                    if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1): 
                        count_won2=count_won2+1; 
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            if(count_all1!=0): 
                
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,count_won1/count_all1,count_all1,count_
won1]) 
            else: 
                final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,0,count_all1,count_won1]) 
                 
            if(count_all2!=0):     
                
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,count_won2/count_all2,count_all2,count_
won2]) 
            else: 
                final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,0,count_all2,count_won2]) 
                 
         
        final_binned_margin=sorted(final_binned_margin,key=itemgetter(0)) 
        final_df=pd.DataFrame(final_binned_margin) 
        final_df.to_csv(outputfile,index=False) 
        outf=open(outputfile2,'w') 
        for i in range(len(final_binned_margin)): 
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line=str(final_binned_margin[i][0])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][1])+"\t"+str(final_bi
nned_margin[i][2])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][3])+"\n" 
            outf.write(line) 
                     
        outf.close()             
                 
        print(year1,year2,partyname,count) 
        wait=input() 
         
             
         
         
                 
             
                 
                     
             
             
         
        """     
            if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
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                #calculate and append BJP margin to year 't' 
                #assuming dataset is sorted within constituency 
                if(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['position_index']]==1 and 
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                    bjp_margin_t1=(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']]) 
                else: 
                    for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                        if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                            bjp_margin_t1=a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']] 
                             
                total_votes=0 
                for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                    total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']] 
                 
                bjp_margin_t1=bjp_margin_t1*100.0/total_votes 
                 
                print(bjp_margin_t1) 
                out_a_t1.append([v,bjp_margin_t1]) 
                margins.append(bjp_margin_t1) 
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        binwidth=1.0                
        numbins=200/binwidth + 1.0 
        bins=np.linspace(-100,100,numbins) 
        hist,bin_edges = np.histogram(margins,bins) 
         
         
         
        x=bin_edges[0:numbins-1] 
        x=x+0.5 
        y=hist 
         
        out_df_t1=pd.DataFrame({'Count':y,'Margin':x}) 
        out_df_t1=out_df_t1[['Margin','Count']] 
        out_df_t1.to_csv(outputfile,index=False) 
        plt.scatter(x,y) 
        plt.grid() 
        plt.plot(x,y) 
        plt.show() 
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        """         
             
     
     
    #for v in unique_vals 
    #    print(df_2009[]) 
     
    #for i in range(len(a2009)): 
    #    for j in range(len(a2009[i])): 
    #        print(a2009[i][j]) 
             
    #for row in df_2009[:25].itertuples(): 
        #print(row) 
         
    #for i in range(1): 
    #    for j in range(14): 
    #        print(a2009[i][j]) 
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Appendix C 
Pandas Code for ‘BJP/INC’ 
 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Sun Jun 26 19:06:52 2016 
 
@author: labuseruni 
""" 
import math 
import pandas as pd 
import numpy as np 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
from operator import itemgetter,attrgetter 
 
 
#df_2009=pd.read_csv('2009.csv') 
bin_width=1 
#set bin_width in percent margin of vote share 
yearlist= [ '1998','1999','2004','2009','2014'] 
partylist= ['INC','BJP'] 
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for year_i in range(0,len(yearlist)-1): 
     
         
#    year1='1998' 
#    year2='1999' 
    year1=yearlist[year_i]; 
    year2=yearlist[year_i+1]; 
    df_t1=pd.read_csv(year1+'.csv') 
    df_t2=pd.read_csv(year2+'.csv') 
    for partyname in partylist: 
        #partyname='INC' 
        outputfile=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v3.csv' 
        outputfile2=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v3.txt' 
        #Replace space in column name with _ 
        df_t1.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t1.columns] 
        df_t2.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t2.columns] 
         
         
        #Rename column names so they arent different across years 
        #Hacks for this to work, should be more seamless using decided key-value pairs for 
'interesting' columns 
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        y2014={'statename': 'State name','pcname': 'PC Name','partyname_index': 
11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 13} 
        y2009={'statename': 'State name','pcname': 'PC Name','partyname_index': 
11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 13} 
        y2004={'statename': 'ST_NAME','pcname': 'PC_NAME','partyname_index': 
10,'votes_index': 11,'position_index' : 12} 
        y1999={'statename': 'ST_NAME','pcname': 'PC_NAME','partyname_index': 
9,'votes_index': 10,'position_index' : 11} 
        y1998={'statename': 'ST_NAME','pcname': 'PC_NAME','partyname_index': 
9,'votes_index': 10,'position_index' : 11} 
         
         
        mydict={'2014':y2014,'2009':y2009,'2004':y2004,'1999':y1999,'1998':y1998} 
         
        dict1=mydict[year1] 
        dict2=mydict[year2] 
         
         
        #creates new column that is unique 
        #2009&2014 have col name 'State_name', previous years have 'ST_NAME' 
        if(year1=='2009' or year1 == '2014'): 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.State_name.str.cat(df_t1.PC_name,sep='_') 
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            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper() 
        else: 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t1.PC_NAME,sep='_') 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper() 
        #PC_names have trailing spaces! - the 'strip' removes these so we can search 
between different years! 
         
        if(year2=='2009' or year2 == '2014'): 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.State_name.str.cat(df_t2.PC_name,sep='_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper() 
        else: 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t2.PC_NAME,sep='_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper() 
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        unique_vals_t1=df_t1['Unique'].unique() 
        unique_vals_t2=df_t2['Unique'].unique() 
        unique_vals = list(set(unique_vals_t1).intersection(unique_vals_t2)) 
        unique_vals.sort() 
        #unique_vals now has id per constituency common to both years 
         
        df_t1_indexed=df_t1.set_index('Unique') 
        df_t2_indexed=df_t2.set_index('Unique') 
        #alternatively, try indexing with two columns? for another day. 
         
         
        #for now, use arrays: 
        a_t1=df_t1.values 
        a_t2=df_t2.values 
         
        out_a_t1=[] 
        margins=[] 
         
        #unique,margin,won_flag 
        margin_based_t1=[] 
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        count=0 
        for v in unique_vals: 
            print(v) 
            df_t1_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t1_indexed.loc[v]) 
            df_t2_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t2_indexed.loc[v]) 
             
            a_t1_constituency_slice=df_t1_constituency_slice.values 
            a_t2_constituency_slice=df_t2_constituency_slice.values 
             
            #Start processing per slice i.e. per constituency 
            total_votes=0 
            margin=0.0 
             
            #index to locate where in the slice the particular party we are interested in lies 
            #assuming dataset is sorted within constituency 
            #if the party was a winner, this will be first pos i.e. value of indec will be 0; else 
non-zero 
            partyname_position_in_slice=-1 
             
            """ 
            if(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \ 
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            or a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \ 
            or a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']] not in partylist \ 
            or a_t2_constituency_slice[1][dict2['partyname_index']] not in partylist ): 
                
#print(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t1_constituency_slice[1][d
ict1['partyname_index']],a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t2_cons
tituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']]) 
                #wait=input()                 
                continue; 
            """ 
                 
            #binary variable -  
            # =1 if party won in t+1 
            # =0 if party did not win in t+1 
            won_flag=0; 
            
print(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t1_constituency_slice[1][di
ct1['partyname_index']],a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']],a_t2_const
ituency_slice[1][dict2['partyname_index']]) 
            count+=1 
            for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']] 
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                if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                    partyname_position_in_slice=i; 
                    #assumption here is that there are never multiple candidates from same party 
contesting the same constituency 
             
            if partyname_position_in_slice==-1: 
                continue; 
                         
             
            if(partyname_position_in_slice==0): 
                margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']] 
            else: 
                
margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[partyname_position_in_slice][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']] 
                 
            margin = margin*100.0/total_votes 
             
            if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                won_flag=1 
            else: 
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                won_flag=0 
             
             
            margin_based_t1.append([v,margin,won_flag]) 
         
         
        #here we have generated margin_based_t1 table 
        #cols are unique(pc_id),margin in t1 for party, flag indicating whether party won or 
not in t2 
        #sort by margin 
         
        margin_based_t1=sorted(margin_based_t1,key=itemgetter(1)) 
        binned_margin_t1=[] 
         
        for i in range(len(margin_based_t1)): 
            bin_no=int(math.floor(abs((margin_based_t1[i][1]))/bin_width)) 
            if(margin_based_t1[i][1]<0.0): 
                sign_flag=-1.0 
            else: 
                sign_flag=+1.0 
            bin_no=int(bin_no*bin_width)+bin_width/2.0 
            bin_no=bin_no*sign_flag 
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            print(margin_based_t1[i][1],bin_no) 
            binned_margin_t1.append([bin_no,margin_based_t1[i][2]]) 
             
         
        half_total_bins=int(math.ceil(100/bin_width))#one-sided total 
        final_binned_margin=[] 
        for i in range(half_total_bins): 
            bin_no_search1=-1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0) 
            bin_no_search2=+1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0) 
             
            count_won1=0 
            count_all1=0 
            count_won2=0 
            count_all2=0     
             
            for j in range(len(binned_margin_t1)): 
                 
                if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search1): 
                    count_all1=count_all1+1;                    
                    if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1): 
                        count_won1=count_won1+1; 
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                if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search2): 
                    count_all2=count_all2+1;                    
                    if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1): 
                        count_won2=count_won2+1; 
            if(count_all1!=0): 
                
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,count_won1/count_all1,count_all1,count_
won1]) 
            else: 
                final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,0,count_all1,count_won1]) 
                 
            if(count_all2!=0):     
                
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,count_won2/count_all2,count_all2,count_
won2]) 
            else: 
                final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,0,count_all2,count_won2]) 
                 
         
        final_binned_margin=sorted(final_binned_margin,key=itemgetter(0)) 
        final_df=pd.DataFrame(final_binned_margin) 
        final_df.to_csv(outputfile,index=False) 
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        outf=open(outputfile2,'w') 
        for i in range(len(final_binned_margin)): 
            
line=str(final_binned_margin[i][0])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][1])+"\t"+str(final_bi
nned_margin[i][2])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][3])+"\n" 
            outf.write(line) 
                     
        outf.close()             
                 
        print(year1,year2,partyname,count) 
        wait=input() 
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        """     
            if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                #calculate and append BJP margin to year 't' 
                #assuming dataset is sorted within constituency 
                if(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['position_index']]==1 and 
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                    bjp_margin_t1=(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']]) 
                else: 
                    for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                        if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                            bjp_margin_t1=a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']] 
                             
                total_votes=0 
                for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                    total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']] 
                 
                bjp_margin_t1=bjp_margin_t1*100.0/total_votes 
                 
                print(bjp_margin_t1) 
                out_a_t1.append([v,bjp_margin_t1]) 
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                margins.append(bjp_margin_t1) 
         
             
         
         
         
        binwidth=1.0                
        numbins=200/binwidth + 1.0 
        bins=np.linspace(-100,100,numbins) 
        hist,bin_edges = np.histogram(margins,bins) 
         
         
         
        x=bin_edges[0:numbins-1] 
        x=x+0.5 
        y=hist 
         
        out_df_t1=pd.DataFrame({'Count':y,'Margin':x}) 
        out_df_t1=out_df_t1[['Margin','Count']] 
        out_df_t1.to_csv(outputfile,index=False) 
        plt.scatter(x,y) 
        plt.grid() 
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        plt.plot(x,y) 
        plt.show() 
             
        """         
             
     
     
    #for v in unique_vals 
    #    print(df_2009[]) 
     
    #for i in range(len(a2009)): 
    #    for j in range(len(a2009[i])): 
    #        print(a2009[i][j]) 
             
    #for row in df_2009[:25].itertuples(): 
        #print(row) 
         
    #for i in range(1): 
    #    for j in range(14): 
    #        print(a2009[i][j]) 
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Appendix D 
Pandas Code for ‘All NDA/UPA’ 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Sun Jun 26 19:06:52 2016 
 
@author: labuseruni 
""" 
import math 
import pandas as pd 
import numpy as np 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
from operator import itemgetter,attrgetter 
 
 
#df_2009=pd.read_csv('2009.csv') 
bin_width=1.0 
#set bin_width in percent margin of vote share 
yearlist= [ '1998','1999','2004','2009','2014'] 
#yearlist= [ '1999','2004'] 
#partylist= ['INC','BJP'] 
partylist= ['NDA','UPA'] 
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for year_i in range(0,len(yearlist)-1): 
     
         
#    year1='1998' 
#    year2='1999' 
    year1=yearlist[year_i]; 
    year2=yearlist[year_i+1]; 
    df_t1=pd.read_csv(year1+'.csv') 
    df_t2=pd.read_csv(year2+'.csv') 
    for partyname in partylist: 
        #partyname='INC' 
        outputfile=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v5.csv' 
        outputfile2=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v5.txt' 
        #Replace space in column name with _ 
        df_t1.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t1.columns] 
        df_t2.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t2.columns] 
         
         
        #Rename column names so they arent different across years 
        #Hacks for this to work, should be more seamless using decided key-value pairs for 
'interesting' columns 
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        y2014={'statename': 'State name','pcname': 'PC Name','partyname_index': 
11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 13,'NDA':['BJP','SHS','TDP','LJP','SAD','BLSP
 ','AD','SWP','PMK
 ','AINRC','NPF','NPEP','IND','RSPK(B)','DMDK','RPI(A)','MDMK','RSPS','HJC
BL'],'UPA':['INC','NCP','RJD','JMM','IUML','RSP','KEC(M)','CPI','BVA','BOPF','RLD','J
KN','MD','SJD']} 
        y2009={'statename': 'State name','pcname': 'PC Name','partyname_index': 
11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 
13,'NDA':['BJP','JD(U)','SHS','RLD','SAD','JMM','AGP','NPF','RWS','INLD','IND'],'UPA
':['INC','AITC','DMK','NCP','JKN','MUL','JMM','VCK','BOPF','KEC(M)','IND','RPI(A)','
RPI']}   
        y2004={'statename': 'ST_NAME','pcname': 'PC_NAME','partyname_index': 
10,'votes_index': 11,'position_index' : 
12,'NDA':['BJP','SHS','BJD','SAD','JD(U)','TDP','AITC','IFDP','NPF','SDF','MNF','IND','
ADMK'],'UPA':['INC','RJD','DMK','NCP','PMK','TRS','LJNSP','JMM','MDMK','CPM','C
PI','MUL','JKPDP','RPI(A)','KEC(M)','JD(S)','IND','AC','RP','PDS','PRBP']} 
        y1999={'statename': 'ST_NAME','pcname': 'PC_NAME','partyname_index': 
9,'votes_index': 10,'position_index' : 
11,'NDA':['BJP','TDP','JD(U)','SHS','DMK','BJD','AITC','PMK','INLD','MDMK','SAD','
ABLTC','IND','MADMK','HVC','SDF','DBSM','TRC','BPSP','AC'],'UPA':['INC','ADMK'
,'RJD','RLD','MUL','BBM','KEC(M)','CPI','CPM','RPI','MCO','AITC']} 
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        y1998={'statename': 'ST_NAME','pcname': 'PC_NAME','partyname_index': 
9,'votes_index': 10,'position_index' : 
11,'NDA':['BJP','ADMK','SAP','BJD','SAD','WBTC','SHS','PMK','LS','MDMK','JD','INC'
,'IND','HVP','NTRTDP(LP)'],'UPA':['INC','RJD','RPI','MUL','KEC(M)','BSP','CPI','MAD
MK','UCPI','SP']} 
         
        #to pick year 
        mydict={'2014':y2014,'2009':y2009,'2004':y2004,'1999':y1999,'1998':y1998} 
         
        #to pick alliance map for that year 
        #adict={'2014':a2014,'2009':a2009,'2004':a2004,'1999':a1999,'1998':a1998} 
 
         
         
        dict1=mydict[year1] 
        dict2=mydict[year2] 
         
         
        #creates new column that is unique 
        #2009&2014 have col name 'State_name', previous years have 'ST_NAME' 
        if(year1=='2009' or year1 == '2014'): 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.State_name.str.cat(df_t1.PC_name,sep='_') 
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            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper() 
        else: 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t1.PC_NAME,sep='_') 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper() 
        #PC_names have trailing spaces! - the 'strip' removes these so we can search 
between different years! 
         
        if(year2=='2009' or year2 == '2014'): 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.State_name.str.cat(df_t2.PC_name,sep='_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper() 
        else: 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t2.PC_NAME,sep='_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_') 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip() 
            df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper() 
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        unique_vals_t1=df_t1['Unique'].unique() 
        unique_vals_t2=df_t2['Unique'].unique() 
        unique_vals = list(set(unique_vals_t1).intersection(unique_vals_t2)) 
        unique_vals.sort() 
        #unique_vals now has id per constituency common to both years 
         
        df_t1_indexed=df_t1.set_index('Unique') 
        df_t2_indexed=df_t2.set_index('Unique') 
        #alternatively, try indexing with two columns? for another day. 
         
         
        #for now, use arrays: 
        a_t1=df_t1.values 
        a_t2=df_t2.values 
         
        out_a_t1=[] 
        margins=[] 
         
        #unique,margin,won_flag 
        margin_based_t1=[] 
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        nda_alliance_list_for_year1=dict1['NDA'] 
        nda_alliance_list_for_year2=dict2['NDA'] 
        upa_alliance_list_for_year1=dict1['UPA'] 
        upa_alliance_list_for_year2=dict2['UPA'] 
         
        count=0 
        for v in unique_vals: 
            print(v) 
            df_t1_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t1_indexed.loc[v]) 
            df_t2_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t2_indexed.loc[v]) 
             
            a_t1_constituency_slice=df_t1_constituency_slice.values 
            a_t2_constituency_slice=df_t2_constituency_slice.values 
             
            #Start processing per slice i.e. per constituency 
            total_votes=0 
            margin=0.0 
             
            #index to locate where in the slice the particular party we are interested in lies 
            #assuming dataset is sorted within constituency 
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            #if the party was a winner, this will be first pos i.e. value of indec will be 0; else 
non-zero 
            partyname_position_in_slice=0 
             
            #if( 
            #a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \ 
            #or a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \ 
            #or a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \ 
            #or a_t2_constituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist ): 
            #    continue; 
            #nda_alliance_list_for_year1=dict1['NDA'] 
            #nda_alliance_list_for_year2=dict2['NDA'] 
            #upa_alliance_list_for_year1=dict1['UPA'] 
            #upa_alliance_list_for_year2=dict2['UPA'] 
                                         
            #binary variable -  
            # =1 if party won in t+1 
            # =0 if party did not win in t+1 
            won_flag=0; 
             
            #hack for alliance - break when first party in alliance is found 
            found_flag=0 
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            count+=1 
             
            current_party_in_slice_year1='' 
            current_party_in_slice_year1_alliance=''                         
            current_party_in_slice_year2=''             
            current_party_in_slice_year2_alliance=''             
            for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']] 
                 
                
current_party_in_slice_year1=a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']] 
                 
                if(current_party_in_slice_year1=='IND'): 
                    continue; 
                 
                if current_party_in_slice_year1 in nda_alliance_list_for_year1: 
                    current_party_in_slice_year1_alliance='NDA' 
                elif(current_party_in_slice_year1 in upa_alliance_list_for_year1): 
                    current_party_in_slice_year1_alliance='UPA' 
                else: 
                    current_party_in_slice_year1_alliance='' 
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#if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                if(current_party_in_slice_year1_alliance==partyname and found_flag==0): 
                    partyname_position_in_slice=i; 
                    found_flag=1; 
                    #assumption here is that there are never multiple candidates from same party 
contesting the same constituency 
             
            if found_flag==0: 
                
print("FFFFFFFFFFFOOOOOOOOUUUUUUUUUUUUNNNNNNNNNDDDDDDDD
D FLLLLLLLLLLLAAAAAAAAAAGGGGGGGGGGG=0!!!!") 
                continue; 
             
            if(partyname_position_in_slice==0): 
                margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']] 
            else: 
                
margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[partyname_position_in_slice][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']] 
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            margin = margin*100.0/total_votes 
             
            
current_party_in_slice_year2=a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']] 
            if current_party_in_slice_year2 in nda_alliance_list_for_year2: 
                current_party_in_slice_year2_alliance='NDA' 
            elif(current_party_in_slice_year2 in upa_alliance_list_for_year2): 
                current_party_in_slice_year2_alliance='UPA' 
            else: 
                current_party_in_slice_year2_alliance='' 
             
            #if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
            if(current_party_in_slice_year2_alliance==partyname): 
                won_flag=1 
            else: 
                won_flag=0 
             
             
             
            margin_based_t1.append([v,margin,won_flag]) 
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        #here we have generated margin_based_t1 table 
        #cols are unique(pc_id),margin in t1 for party, flag indicating whether party won or 
not in t2 
        #sort by margin 
         
        margin_based_t1=sorted(margin_based_t1,key=itemgetter(1)) 
        binned_margin_t1=[] 
         
        print("Here--------------->",binned_margin_t1)         
             
        for i in range(len(margin_based_t1)): 
            bin_no=int(math.floor(abs((margin_based_t1[i][1]))/bin_width)) 
            if(margin_based_t1[i][1]<0.0): 
                sign_flag=-1.0 
            else: 
                sign_flag=+1.0 
            bin_no=int(bin_no*bin_width)+bin_width/2.0 
            bin_no=bin_no*sign_flag 
            print(margin_based_t1[i][1],bin_no) 
            binned_margin_t1.append([bin_no,margin_based_t1[i][2]]) 
             
         
 96 
        half_total_bins=int(math.ceil(100/bin_width))#one-sided total 
        final_binned_margin=[] 
        for i in range(half_total_bins): 
            bin_no_search1=-1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0) 
            bin_no_search2=+1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0) 
             
            count_won1=0.0 
            count_all1=0.0 
            count_won2=0.0 
            count_all2=0.0   
             
            for j in range(len(binned_margin_t1)): 
                 
                if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search1): 
                    count_all1=count_all1+1;                    
                    if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1): 
                        count_won1=count_won1+1; 
                         
                if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search2): 
                    count_all2=count_all2+1;                    
                    if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1): 
                        count_won2=count_won2+1; 
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            if(count_all1!=0): 
                
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,count_won1/count_all1,count_all1,count_
won1]) 
            else: 
                final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,0,count_all1,count_won1]) 
                 
            if(count_all2!=0):     
                
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,count_won2/count_all2,count_all2,count_
won2]) 
            else: 
                final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,0,count_all2,count_won2]) 
                 
         
        final_binned_margin=sorted(final_binned_margin,key=itemgetter(0)) 
        final_df=pd.DataFrame(final_binned_margin) 
        final_df.to_csv(outputfile,index=False) 
        outf=open(outputfile2,'w') 
        for i in range(len(final_binned_margin)): 
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line=str(final_binned_margin[i][0])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][1])+"\t"+str(final_bi
nned_margin[i][2])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][3])+"\n" 
            outf.write(line) 
                     
        outf.close()             
                 
        print(count) 
           """     
            if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                #calculate and append BJP margin to year 't' 
                #assuming dataset is sorted within constituency 
                if(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['position_index']]==1 and 
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                    bjp_margin_t1=(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']]) 
                else: 
                    for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                        if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname): 
                            bjp_margin_t1=a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]-
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']] 
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                total_votes=0 
                for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]): 
                    total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']] 
                 
                bjp_margin_t1=bjp_margin_t1*100.0/total_votes 
                 
                print(bjp_margin_t1) 
                out_a_t1.append([v,bjp_margin_t1]) 
                margins.append(bjp_margin_t1) 
         
             
         
         
         
        binwidth=1.0                
        numbins=200/binwidth + 1.0 
        bins=np.linspace(-100,100,numbins) 
        hist,bin_edges = np.histogram(margins,bins) 
         
         
         
        x=bin_edges[0:numbins-1] 
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        x=x+0.5 
        y=hist 
         
        out_df_t1=pd.DataFrame({'Count':y,'Margin':x}) 
        out_df_t1=out_df_t1[['Margin','Count']] 
        out_df_t1.to_csv(outputfile,index=False) 
        plt.scatter(x,y) 
        plt.grid() 
        plt.plot(x,y) 
        plt.show() 
             
        """         
             
     
     
    #for v in unique_vals 
    #    print(df_2009[]) 
     
    #for i in range(len(a2009)): 
    #    for j in range(len(a2009[i])): 
    #        print(a2009[i][j]) 
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    #for row in df_2009[:25].itertuples(): 
        #print(row) 
         
    #for i in range(1): 
    #    for j in range(14): 
    #        print(a2009[i][j]) 
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